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STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NAVIGABLE
AIRSPACE
By MADELINE C. DINU
General Counsel to, National Association of State Aviation Offi-
cials; Wayne University, LL.B., graduate studies in aeronautical law
under the late John H. Wigmore, Northwestern University; member
of the Michigan Bar. Formerly, Assistant Attorney General for Avi-
ation in Michigan.
T HERE appeared in the Winter 1948 issue of the JOURNAL an article
entitled "State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable
Airspace" by John C. Cooper.' It was a timely and a warning discussion
of a legal question with which public officials, entrusted with the de-
velopment and regulation of civil aviation in the United States at both
federal and state levels have been and are continuing to be confronted.
This practical problem has been brought to the forefront of public
attention recently because of interpretations of the implications in the
1946 and 1947 decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
Causby2 and the California "Tidelands"3 cases. The Causby opinion
rests on the theory that while owners of private property also own as
much of the airspace above as may be required for normal enjoyment of
the surface, the airspace above that is "within the public domain" and
open for public transit free of any trespass claim. The California
"Tidelands" case holds that the federal government has paramount
interest in the area within the three mile limit off the coast of Cali-
fornia, and in physical property above or beneath the water there.
This, the Court stated, arose from the paramount national interest in
protection of international commerce, national defense, and preserva-
tion of natural resources, and turns on the decision that the State of
California never acquired such national prerogatives.
The implications drawn from these decisions upon State sovereignty
call for vigorous and courageous action by Congress either through
effective federal legislation definitely and clearly outlining the respec-
tive areas of jurisdiction in the airspace, or by the calling of a Consti-
tutional Convention to amend the United States Constitution.
Lacking such action, the people of the respective states, as sovereigns
of their own self-governments, will be projecting their future actions
into a period of confusion and their tremendous investments will be
a loss so great as to affect our national economy in an unprecedented
manner. Each member of the United States Congress, being a repre-
sentative of the people of his or her respective state, should and must
1 15 J. Air L. & Com. 27 (1948).
2 U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
3 U.S. v. Stata of California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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give exhaustive attention to the solution of this problem. As our
civilization is projected more and more into the Air Age, the navigable
airspace will be increasingly utilized for daily concerns.
I. WHAT IS SOVEREaIGNTY?
In a democracy the will of the people as expressed in their form of
government, has created an entity clothed with civil and political pow-
ers with which to execute that will. In a definition of terms, one stand-
ard legal reference ' notes that "sovereignty" in its broadest sense means
"supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the absolute right to gov-
ern." It describes "sovereign power" as:
"Power without limitation. Term has been applied to the peo-
ple of the state in their sovereign capacity, acting through their
representatives, the legislature. In all governments of constitu-
tional limitations, sovereign power manifests itself in but three
ways. By exercising the right of taxation; the right of eminent do-
main; and through its police power."
This same text offers a definition of "jurisdiction":5
"In the absence of any particular agreement or of particular
provisions in the acts of admission varying the ordinary rules, the
jurisdiction of a state is coextensive with its boundaries, extending
throughout its territorial limits and operating upon all the persons
and things located or situated there, and, conversely, limited to its
own territorial limits and not extending beyond its boundaries."
It must be remembered the thirteen sovereign colonies, in forming the
United States, retained the sovereign power of self-government in the
people. The people established themselves as separate sovereign states,
and, after the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, whenever a new state
was admitted to the Union, it was under specific written declarations
that they were admitted as an equal sovereign state and retained the
sovereign power of self-government save for the enumerated powers
vested in the national government to wage war, enter into treaties, issue
money, and govern commerce between the states and other nations.
The Federal and State governments existed as separate sovereigns and
jurisdiction of one over its particular field may not be interfered with
by the other. This principle has been enunciated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in numerous decisions from very early days.6
There was therefore established a dual form of sovereignty, one
which is basically "internal" in character, and the other "external" in
effect. The several states reserved to themselves the power to regulate
matters affecting their own people, but whenever those matters re-
quired action and treatment with other states or foreign nations, the na-
4 58 Corpus Juris 812.
5 59 Corpus Juris 18.
6 Crapo vs. Keely, 16 Wall (U.S.) 113; 20 L.Ed. 122; U.S. vs. Fox, 94 U.S.
315; Buffington vs. Day, 11 Wall (U.S.) 113; Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S. 714;
U.S. vs. Robinson, 74 F.Sup. 427; New Hampshire vs. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76.
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tional government was to exercise its "external" powers.7 The Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution provides that "The powers, not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."
It has therefore become a recognized rule of constitutional construc-
tion that the government of the United States is one of enumerated
powers. Yet since the historic days of the adoption of the Constitution
there has been a slow but consistent assumption by the federal govern-
ment of powers affecting the internal affairs of the several states, alleg-
edly to advance the general welfare and national economy. As the
Honorable Julian P. Alexander wrote only two years ago:s
"The reasons for these accessions of power cannot be simply
stated. As safe a judgment as any is that the Union has expanded
its powers because the States have spoken too often of States'
rights when they should have been pondering States' duties. Usur-
pation of power by the National Government has developed be-
cause: (1) it has recognized new duties; and (2) because the States
have ignored old duties. The Union has picked up a lot of loose
powers which the States left lying around.
"Between the admitted sectors of powers granted and powers
reserved lay a disputed area of 'implied powers' and of powers
deemed 'necessary and proper.' Into this penumbra, the judiciary
guided the steps of the executive and legislative branches with a
flickering light which, while sufficient to locate and stake its claim
of preemption, unfortunately, cast foreboding shadows.
"The 'interstate commerce' clause has been a golden gate of
opportunity through which have poured the forces of federal usur-
pation under the aegis of 'implied powers.' Practically every activ-
ity is seen as being 'affected with a public interest.' I need not
trace the history of a tendency that has been given repeated im-
pulses and only token setbacks through the intervening years.
9
"By 1935, a federal court had asserted boldly that the States had
virtually surrendered all powers they could not efficiently exercise.10
It was held in June of 1942 11 that Congress can regulate the wages
and hours of work for anyone engaged in any occupation necessary
to the production of godds not in but for, interstate commerce.
"No one need question the integrity and open frankness of the
Supreme Court in pronouncing, without circumlocution, that legis-
lation must be construed 'in the context of the history of federal
absorption of governmental authority over industrial enterprise,' 12
and the admission, nay the assertion, that the Act is one of those
which 'radically readjusts the balance of state and national author-
ity.' 13 1 quote further: 'To a considerable extent the task is one of
7 Toomer vs. Witsell, 73 F. Sup. 371; U.S. vs. Curtiss Wright Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936); 2 TIEDEMAN: STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPER-
TY, 1008 et seq.
8 Alexander, "States of the Union: Time to Start Restoring Their Powrs,"
33 A. B. A. Jour. (1947).
9 U.S. vs. DeWitt, 9 Wall 41 (1869); Sullen vs. State, 4 So. (2d) 356 (1941);
Bryce, The American Commonwealth 321.
10 R. C. Tway Coal Co. vs. Glenn, 12 F.Sup. 570, 589 (W. D. Ky. 1935).
11 A. B. Kirschbaum Co. vs. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
12 Id. at 523.
Is Id. at 522.
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accommodation as between assertions of new federal authority and
historic functions of the individual states.' " Whence this 'new
federal authority'? Were such powers reserved, not to the States,
but to the Union, after all? Bryce was right-the Constitution has
not been broken-'but its elasticity has met every requirement of
the Federal Bureau of Standards." 15
Not only the states and their governments have realized the
encroachments on their sovereign rights, but that. great scholars and
thinkers formerly associated with the United States Supreme Court
have felt keenly the untenable position of conflicting Federal-State gov-
* ernment is seen in "A Constitutional Amendment to Curb Federal Cen-
tralization," by the Honorable Owen J. Roberts, President of the Penn-
sylvania Bar Association, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States.' 6 His proposal to remedy this situation fol-
lows:.
"Nevertheless, I think it might be a salutary thing if political
leaders and influential citizens should initiate a movement to amend
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 8, so as to define the general welfare which Con:
gress may promote by appropriation and to define what is a permis-
sible federal regulation of interstate commerce. The provisions
I have quoted seem to me to be the loop-holes through which the
federal invasion has poured into the domain of the States. It would
be interesting, I think, to determine how far our people generally
are loyal to the spirit and concept of the Constitution in these re-
spects. We should at least discover whether there is a sentiment to
preserve, protect, and foster State jurisdiction and State power, or
whether our people prefer something more nearly approaching alien
systems, wherein the States are mere administrative districts of a
central government."
There is a glimmering of light in the public awareness that taxes are
the underlying moving force of the trend toward federal usurpation of
power to govern the internal affairs of states. With more tax funds at
its command, the federal government agencies are impelled to create
more needs to be encompassed within "the public interest." The
Michigan Legislature in April of 1949 passed a concurrent resolution
making application to the Congress of the United States for the calling
of a Convention to propose an Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States to provide for a return to the states of certain taxes or
portions thereof as a matter of right.17 It reads in part as follows:
"Whereas, the federal government is using and has been using
for a number of years, the taxing power to produce revenue beyond
a legitimate necessity of a federal government, other than defense
needs, and has been using the funds so raised to invade the province
14 Id. at 520.
15 President Roosevelt had given no little impetus to this tendency in a radio
speech March 2, 1930. "The United States Constitution has proven itself a most
marvelously elastic combination of rules of government ever written."
16 A.B.A.J. August 1948, p. 649.
17 The Michigan Proposal to Amend the Constitution of the United States
Relative to Taxing Power-By the Joint Committee of the Legislature Created
to Advance the Proposal-booklets may be secured by writing to Eugene F.
Sharkoff, Secretary, P.O. Box 240, Lansing, Michigan.
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of legislation of the states and to appropriate in many fields that
which amounts to a dole to the states of the money raised therefrom
to accomplish many purposes, most of them worthy, but by the de-
scribed process making the money available only under conditions
which result in a control by the federal government from central-
ized agencies in Washington, in many cases unfit, and in other cases
unable to administer the laws according to the local needs because
of varying conditions in the country as a whole; resulting in inequi-
ties in the administration of the very benefits purported to be
granted; and
"Whereas, State and local needs are disadvantaged because the
people are already taxed far beyond the real need for any purpose
other than forcing the centralization of al1 government in Washing-
ton; and
"Whereas, the framers of the Constitution of the United States
clearly foresaw the possibility of a condition similar to that herein
described, and made provision in the Constitution for safeguarding
the states against any oppression or invasion of rights by the fed-
eral government; therefore be it
"Resolved, by the Legislature of the State of Michigan; That
said Legislature, hereby and pursuant to Article V of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, makes application to the Congress of the
United States to call a convention for the proposing of the following
amendment to the Constitution of the United States: . .
The writer has felt it necessary to trace "sovereignty" in some detail,
because there are many instances of unsound arguments being used for
federal usurpation of power. This is now being seen in the field of
aviation.
Before going into the navigable airspace sovereignty phase, there is
cited one further recent example. 18 The military services, without so
much as a "beg your leave," attempted to set off a large area of one of
the Great Lakes, more specifically two large areas in Lake Huron for
an aerial gunnery range. It was their intention to exclude from these
areas all boats, whether pleasure, commercial, or industrial, and also
whether intra-state or inter-state. Through that area pass the endless
number of ore and wheat and other commodities boats from the upper-
most points in Lake Superior down to the Atlantic Ocean and inter-
mediate industrial points. Obviously, to all intents and purposes, it
was their further intention that these areas would be under the exclu-
sive control and jurisdiction of the military establishments of the fed-
eral government to the end that their personnel might have free, un-
hampered, unhindered and uninterrupted control over and use of those
areas of waterl! As the Attorney General, the Honorable Stephen J.
Roth, stated in his exhaustive brief in behalf of the sovereign state of
Michigan: "The State of Michigan is. one of the sovereign states of the
'1 Statement by Nicholas V. Olds, Assistant Attorney 'General for the State
of Michigan before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Con-
cerning the Ownership of that portion of the Great Lakes within the Territorial
Boundaries of the State of Michigan, Oct. 1949.
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United States of America. It cannot be treated as occupied territory of
an enemy nation."1 9
SOVEREIGNTY AS FOUND IN AVIATION LAW
Section 6 of the Air Commerce Act of 192620 stated that the United
States government "has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, com-
plete sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and waters of the
United States"; and Section 1021 defined navigable airspace as airspace
above the minimum safe altitudes of flight set forth in the Act. Section
1107 (i) (3) 22 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 amended Section 6
of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 so as to read:
"The United States of America is hereby declared to possess and
exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air
space above the United States, including the air space above all in-
land waters and the air space above those portions of the adjacent
marginal high seas, bays, and lakes, over which by international law
or treaty or convention the United States exercises national juris-
diction." (Italics added.)
It should be noted also that the multilateral Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation concluded at Chicago in 1944 is based23 upon
the complete and exclusive national sovereignty of the signatory pow-
ers, as are the bilateral executive agreements for the exchange of air
landing rights negotiated both before and after that important com-
pact.
Then came the oft discussed Causby decision of 1946 construing the
1926 and 1938 statutes, an opinion which one distinguished advocate of
federal supremacy in the skies has interpreted 24 as meaning that "in
the upper zone (the navigable airspace) the rights of the Federal Gov-
ernment seem to have been considered so paramount that Congress was
able to place the navigable airspace, as stated in the Court's opinion,
'within the public domain.'"
Reading the Causby and California "Tidelands" cases together, that
same author concluded that "Either the several States may be held
under these rulings to be entirely without sovereignty or right of con-
trol in the navigable airspace over their surface territories, or the
power and rights of the Federal government may be found so para-
mount in the navigable airspace as to produce the same legal results. '2 5
There is also put forth the argument that the navigable airspace
being capable of being construed as "public domain" by virtue of the
10 Brief of the Attorney General of Michigan, the Hon. Stephen J. Roth, filed
with U.S. Military Establishment and U.S. Corps of Engineers, January 1949.
20 44 Stat. 572, 49 USCA 176 (Supp. 1947).
21 44 Stat. 574, 49 USCA 181 (Supp. 1947).
22 52 Stat. 1027, 49 USCA 677 (Supp. 1947).
23 Article 1.
24 Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspacl,
15 J. Air L. & Com. 27 (1948).
25 Ibid.
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Tidelands decision it may be treated as "new territory" which the states
have no constitutional right to acquire, a prerogative solely resting in
the federal governmentl
Having reviewed the highlights of some of the points frequently
utilized by those who preach complete federal supremacy, it is now
necessary to test them in the light of the law. This may serve to illumi-
nate properly certain aspects of the problem which have received com-
paratively little attention in an era of continually growing federal
power.
External and Internal Sovereignty
One may begin by observing that the question of state or federal
sovereignty over the navigable airspace is obviously a constitutional
one, and can be resolved 'only by definitive interpretation of the
United States Constitution by the appropriate judicial authorities, or
by an amendment to the Constitution itself. Mere statements that
complete and exclusive sovereignty is in the United States, such as
those embodied in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and in the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, cannot be of any genuine assistance in finding
a solution. First, they must be viewed as legislativre announcements
by the national government that it has and will exercise full control
over these skies in the society of nations, i.e., declarations of exclusive
sovereignty vis-a-vis foreign powers, but hardly controlling on ,funda-
mental constitutional questions such as internal sovereignty. This dis-
tinction between internal and external sovereignty has been accepted
even by those who favor federal supremacy.26 Second, it must be recog-
nized that a mere statute cannot give the federal government power
which it does not have under the Constitution.27
Nor is the exclusive external federal sovereignty expressed and/or
implied in the Chicago Convention and the bilateral agreements de-
cisive, for while a treaty may be the supreme law of the land there is
no basis for an argument that one may override the Constitution. In
any case, both the Chicago text and the executive agreements deal
solely with external sovereignty.
There is some good old-fashioned case law on the problem, how-
ever, decisions which clearly imply that the federal government does
not have complete sovereignty over the navigable airspace above the
United States to the exclusion of state authority. It was two years after
passage of the Air Commerce Act that Chief Justice Rugg of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held: 2s
"It is essential to the safety of sovereign States that they pos-
sess jurisdiction to control the airspace above their territories. It
seems to us to rest on the obvious practical necessity of self-protec-
26 Id at note 10.
27 Id at note 8.
28 Smith ve. New England Aircraft Company, Inc., 170 N.W. 285 (1930).
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tion. Every government completely sovereign in character must
possess power to prevent from entering its confines those whom it
determines to be undesirable. That power extends to the exclusion
from the air of all hostile persons or demonstrations, and to the
regulation of passage through the air of all persons in the interests
of the public welfare and the safety of those on the face of the
earth. This jurisdiction was vested in this Commonwealth when it
became a sovereign State on its separation from Great Britain. So
far as concerns interstate commerce, postal service, and some other
matters, jurisdiction over passage through the air in large part was
surrendered to the United States by the adoption of the FederalConstitution."
It was to achieve just this self-protection to which their citizens were
entitled that the several governments of the States passed various regu-
lations 29 concerning the operation of aircraft within the airspace above
their territories. In a 1935 decision in Parker v. Granger 80 which was
later approved by the Supreme Court of California,8 ' and which was de-
nied certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, 82 it was ruled:
"The flight of the planes mentioned herein was intra-state, and
under the federal Constitution and the California Aircraft Act en-
acted in 1929 (St. 1929, p. 1874), the state of California was vested
with exclusive power to prescribe air traffic rules to govern the
operation of aircraft in flying in purely intrastate flights."
In addition, one should take into account the 1944 Opinion of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Evickson v. King as State Auditor of the
State of Minnesota which declared: 33
"Subject to the jurisdiction conferred upon Congress by the fed-
eral Constitution relative to post roads, interstate commerce, and
national defense, the state has complete sovereignty of the air above
its territory and may exert its police power therein."
These cases seem to indicate that certain aspects of air navigation
are properly within the jurisdiction of the state governments, and that
there is a legal duty for the state governments to protect the local inter-
ests of their inhabitants.
Yet, despite these decisions, both the Civil Aeronautics Board and
the Civil Aeronautics Administration appear to be intent upon inter-
preting Section 1 (3) of the Act of 1938 34 so that practically all flying
comes under federal control. There has been a pursuing of this policy
deliberately, arguing that just about every flight is likely either to affect
directly or endanger safety in interstate, overseas, or foreign air com-
merce. This is clearly a dangerous oversimplification of the facts, and a
threat of future federal intervention in intrastate aeronautics, and the
right of the states to protect their citizens under their police power from
29 STILL, STATE AVIATION LAWS, Pub. Affairs Bull. No. 53, Legislative Ref.
Ser. of Library of Congress, Washington (1947).
80 39 P.(2d) 833 (1935).
8152 P.(2) 226 (1935).
82 298 U.S. 644 (1936).
88 15 N.W.(2d) 201 (1944).
34 52 Stat. 977, 49 USCA 401 (Supp. 1947).
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dangerous use of the air by anyone. It is another manifestation of the
continuing invasion of state responsibility and power. Can it be said
that the states have no right to regulate and police the airports used by
aircraft which are constructed upon land located within their jurisdic-
tion? Can it be said that if a felon has committed a bank robbery and a
murder in the course of it, and uses a plane for his getaway, but while
in flight he traverses a federal airway. on which interstate scheduled air-
lines may have a route, his flight so affects interstate commerce as to
make him immune to the state's police powers?
.A LOOK INTO THE CAUSBY AND CALIFORNIA "TIDELANDS" CASES
Before the decisions in the Causby and California "Tidelands" liti-
gation, proponents of exclusive federal control over navigable airspace
relied principally upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce,35 provide for the common defense and the general welfare,386
and to establish post roads37 for constitutional support. A newer theory
as to the constitutional basis for exclusive federal control over navigable
airspace has been evolving from those two cases. It holds that, as in the
case of the tidelands, the federal government has a proprietary interest
in navigable airspace over land within its boundaries and thereby exclu-
sive power to regulate the use thereof. Federal power would be abso-
lute and exclusive, as in the case of other property owned by the
national government, 38 and would not be dependent upon the above
mentioned constitutional clauses. This is the newest brain child pro-
posed to usurp still further the power of the states to protect its citizens
from malignant uses of the airl
Careful consideration of this theory is essential. So far as the pri-
vate property owner is concerned, the superadjacent non-navigable air-
space below safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the CAA is so close to
the land, that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of
the land itself. Therefore, such non-navigable airspace has the quality
of property, and as an incident to his ownership of the land, the land-
owner has a claim to such non-navigable airspace. Invasions of it are
like trespass on the surface, and the rights of the private property-owner
are paramount in such non-navigable airspace. The Supreme Court
has held, however,39 that he has no rights in the navigable airspace, -
for it is in the "public domain."
Should the Supreme Court later conclude that the navigable air-
space has .the qualities of property, also, it might apply the tests utilized
in the California "Tidelands" case to find no valid State claim. It
might find that problems of national and international use of such air-
space are such as to require exclusive federal control. But while one
35 U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, See. 8, clause 3.
36 Id, clause 1.
37 Id, clause 7.
88 Utah Power & Light Co. vs. U.S., 243 U.S. 389, at 404-5 (1917).
39 U.S. vs. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, at 261-7 (1946).
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may comprehend how non-navigable airspace may be so intimately con-
nected with the use of the land as to be substantially a part of the sur-
face itself and have qualities of property, it is difficult to visualize how
the navigable airspace may possess such qualities. The former is rela-
tively confined in area, - that is patterned after the area on the ground
and upward for a relatively short distance, - and control thereover may
be asserted and made reasonably effective. But the latter begins where
the limits of effective control substantially end, and extends outward to
infinity.40 For all practical purposes, it is beyond control at the present
time, unless a modern Magi can conjure a magic carpet to suspend at
various levels in the air for purposes of federal determination of its pro-
prietary rights in that domain!
It is interesting to observe that in the Causby case the Supreme
Court attributed qualities of property only to the non-navigable air-
space, and stated that the navigable airspace was in the public domain.
The Court cited with approval 4' the opinion of the Court of Appeals
of the Ninth Circuit in Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport,42 which held
that the navigable airspace "belongs to the world." The rationale lead-
ing to this is founded on the premise that "the air, like the sea, is by its
nature incapable of private ownership, except insofar as one may actu-
ally use it." If applied by analogy, the California "Tidelands" decision
would affect only the non-navigable airspace, and the tenor of the opin-
ion is such as to favor a belief that the Supreme Court would resolve
any conflict of jurisdiction over non-navigable airspace with a ruling for
the States.
Not only are fundamental principles of constitutional law involved
here, but the practical aspects of self-government of local affairs by the
people take on greater importance. It is of no difference to the victim
on the ground whether the object is dropped on him from the air below
or within the navigable airspace. His private rights are invaded just as
forcibly and damagingly, and the citizen looks to his state government
to protect such rights through the police power which the people have
delegated to it.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The United States Supreme Court's decisions in the Causby and
the California "Tidelands" cases have brought about an
untenable position for the states, as those decisions may affect
their rights in the navigable airspace over their respective ter-
ritorial jurisdictions.
2. Sovereignty, as defined for federal powers delegated to the cen-
tral government in the -Constitution, is for national and exter-
nal concerns, and not as justification for encroachment on the
40 See, Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowners and
Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. Air Law 329, 347-55 (1932).
41 U.S. vs. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 at 264.
42 84 F.(2d) 755, at 758 (9th CCA, 1936).
STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN AIRSPACE
sovereignty of the states in matters of outright local internal
concerns.
3. National or external concerns affecting use of the air remain as
they have been since the adoption of the Constitution in the
federal government, and their purposes are in protection of
this Nation viz-a-viz other Nations, the international use of
the airspace over the United States and its territories, and over
commerce among the states.
4. Federal usurpation of state sovereignty by steadily growing
expanding interpretations of the "commerce clause" and now
"proprietary interest" of the federal government, either
through direct legislation, interpretations of law by means of
regulations and procedures of federal bureaus, and by use of
medium of federal grants-in-aid, has reached proportions en-
tirely foreign to the form of government intended by the orig-
inal drafters of the Constitution and the spirit of the form of
self-government the people still believe in.
5. The police powers of a state in protection of the public welfare
within its territorial jurisdiction is inherent with its sover-
eignty.
6. The United States Supreme Court in interpreting federal pow-
ers of acquisition of so-called new territory "without the con-
sent of the people" has gone beyond historic principles of
constitutional delegation of powers, and brings about a falla-
cious premise upon which advocates of federal sovereignty in
the navigable airspace predicate their arguments.
7. Legislation by Congress clearly defining areas of federal-state
jurisdictions in the navigable airspace, bearing in mind the
dual sovereign character of our system of government, is one
of the needed solutions. In the alternative, only a constitu-
tional amendment can resolve the problem, if the Congress
fails to act.
It is hoped that something less drastic than a Constitutional Amend-
ment may suffice to protect the interest of the States in the navigable
airspace. The legitimacy of this concern has been well established by
competent legal authorities, 43 and the time is at hand for some form of
courageous action.
43 See the article on The Air Domain of the United States by Frederic P. Lee,
then legislative counsel for the United States Senate, in the LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926 issued by the Government Printing Office in
1928 and reprinted in 1943; also Bouv6, State Sovereignty or International
Sovereignty over Navigable Airspace, 3 J.D.C. Bar Ass'n. 5(1936) and Bouv ,
The Development of International Rules of Conduct in Air Navigation, 1 Air L.
Rev. 1 (1930).
